Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]
Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
《公共事物的治理之道》✋ 来个记录:刚开始读这本书有点困难,翻译蹩脚,看到中间才渐入佳境。这位女士精彩地通过案例分析(选了些小范围的公共池塘资源)建构出整个制度变迁的框架,了解公共池塘资源的哪些内外部变量起了促进作用或阻碍作用。书中介绍了三个传统分析公共物...
評分奥斯特罗姆通过大量的事例,向我们介绍关于公共事务治理方法,并进行后续分析。由三个理论引出本书的内容分析,包括哈丁的“公地灾难”、“囚犯难题”及奥尔森的“集体行动的逻辑”。这些理论模型都说明,个人的理性行动最终导致的却是集体无理性的结果。 对此,以往认为的解...
評分正如上贴所言,为何无人识,确实非常奇怪的,国内学者好像很少引用这本书,研究新制度经济学的,对这本书好像推荐不多?自己还是上西方财政学时,老师在讲公共品时,对这本书有初步的介绍。作者研究的是社区合作,而这不在政府与市场之内,也许这就是被经济学家们忽略的...
評分由于学识尚浅,没有很高深的评论。 不知道是不是因为作者是女性的缘故,我认为她的分析是非常有“人情味儿”的。现在许多理论是机械式的,将人们当做有固定程式的机器人来进行分析的,而且常常令人感到冷漠和绝望——比如众所周知的理性经济人假设。而作者认为...
評分在新版的政治科学手册中,本书被排在二战后引用率最高的四部政治学著作之一,然而我们却不得不记住,这部作品是在1990年才出版的。作者艾利诺·奥斯特罗姆女士更是当代美国最负盛名的政治学者之一,曾经担任美国政治学会主席一职。如果继续各种头衔和荣誉的介绍,我都会觉...
經典論著
评分製度設計
评分因為經典,所以近於常識;語言平順,邏輯清晰。
评分製度設計
评分諾貝爾奬獲得者的著作還是很值得一讀,模型概念論述加案例分析詳實且有創新,標杆啊
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