What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule – the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule – the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.
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现在再翻翻书中中国的部分,Svolik教授估计要大跌眼镜了吧....
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评分课程需要,只读了前两章,基本上是全书的一个梗概和介绍,不管是作者的结论还是方法,比如对威权政体的再分类对比GEDDES都更加的精致,综合性更高,也算是研究威权和独裁的绝佳专著了,有机会接着读完。
评分作者无疑是该路径的集大成者。总体来讲,权力分享部分比威权控制要精彩。
评分其实是简单的土崩瓦解论!
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