What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule – the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule – the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.
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拋開形式模型不說,至少是超越瞭Geddes的,最科學完整的威權分類。
评分教授大人實際上有要求我這個勉強過瞭綜閤考的人,暑假還要加強修煉,每個星期都從她那邊弄本書迴去精讀...
评分現在再翻翻書中中國的部分,Svolik教授估計要大跌眼鏡瞭吧....
评分內容鞭闢入裏,發人深省,雖然看的不是很懂,但博弈論數學證明很厲害
评分2015
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