The Evolution of Cooperation 在線電子書 圖書標籤: 心理學 博弈論 社會學 進化心理學 英文原版 科普 管理 政治學
發表於2025-02-02
The Evolution of Cooperation 在線電子書 pdf 下載 txt下載 epub 下載 mobi 下載 2025
the winner always uses TIT FOR TAT and cooperation can be developed without central authority
評分takeaways: niceness, forgiveness, retaliatory, clean
評分看看
評分takeaways: niceness, forgiveness, retaliatory, clean
評分從閤作如何産生入手,通過建立簡單的博弈模型,加以程序模擬,來說明[一報還一報]穩定的原因。挺好讀的一本書,不需要任何基礎知識。
Robert Axelrod is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Michigan. A MacArthur Prize Fellow, he is a leading expert on game theory, artificial intelligence, evolutionary biology, mathematical modeling, and complexity theory. He lives in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Updated for the first time, the classic book on why cooperation is not only natural but also the best survival strategy The Evolution of Cooperation addresses a simple yet age-old question: If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. This unexpected victory proved that cooperation--one might even say altruism--is mathematically possible and therefore needs no hidden hand or divine agent to create and sustain it. A great roadblock to the understanding of all sorts of behavior was at last removed. The updated edition includes an extensive new chapter on cooperation in cancer cells and among terrorist organizations. "This book, if read, grasped and applied, could have a profound effect." ( Wall Street Journal ) "A fascinating, provocative, and important book." (Douglas R. Hofstadter, author of Godel, Escher, Bach )
这本不到200页的小书很像作者的博士学位论文,因为各个章节的编排很有我写的博士论文的样子——不是很系统,是某一个idea在各个领域的应用和延伸思考。这个idea就是:“一报还一报”(英文名Tit for Tat)这样的具有“善良性”、“可激怒性”、“宽容性”、“清晰性”的策...
評分持续的重复囚徒困境中的四个简单建议: 1. 不要嫉妒; 2. 不要首先背叛; 3. 对合作与背叛都要给以回报; 4. 不要耍小聪明。 一个成功的决策规则所应有的四个特性: 1.善良性:只要对方合作,你就合作以避免不必要的冲突; 2.报复性:面对他人的无理背叛,你是可激怒的; 3.宽...
評分以前写的一篇文章,聊作书评了 —————————— 最近《赤壁》热映,继易中天教授之后给三国历史又烧上一把火。我今天想谈谈三国之中最被神话的一个人物——关羽。是的,最大的神话不是多智近妖的诸葛亮,而是我们的武圣关二哥。在正史《三国志》中功绩平平(实在是一介武...
評分本书中遇到的程序都是独立的,你对这个程序的做法不会影响另一个程序对你的反应。一报还一报很容易实现。 但是,假设一下下面的情景: A是个恶棍。B,C, D是好人。A和他们关系很好。 A曾经害过我,BCD曾经帮过我。 我如果要找A复仇,就会伤害B,C, D,让B,C, D也找我复仇...
The Evolution of Cooperation 在線電子書 pdf 下載 txt下載 epub 下載 mobi 下載 2025