Being Realistic about Reasons 在線電子書 pdf 下載 txt下載 epub 下載 mobi 下載 2025

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T. M. Scanlon 作者

Oxford University Press

譯者

2014-3-15 出版日期

144 頁數

USD 29.95 價格

Hardcover

叢書系列

9780199678488 圖書編碼

Being Realistic about Reasons 在線電子書圖書標籤: 哲學 ethics 倫理學 Philosophy 元倫理學 normative 實踐基礎 reason

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發表於2025-02-23

Being Realistic about Reasons 在線電子書 epub 下載 mobi 下載 pdf 下載 txt 下載 2025

Being Realistic about Reasons 在線電子書 epub 下載 pdf 下載 mobi 下載 txt 下載 2025

Being Realistic about Reasons 在線電子書 pdf 下載 txt下載 epub 下載 mobi 下載 2025

Being Realistic about Reasons 在線電子書用戶評價

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1. 對規範性事實的本體論和規範性的認識論和確定性的討論尤其富有啓發性，從數學哲學那裏尋求的對於規範性事實的獨立性和確定性的支援雖然深刻但並不那麼令人信服。這一方麵還有繼續探討的巨大空間。 2. 對理由的強度的討論顯示齣作者的猶豫不決，這顯示齣前麵的討論並沒有很好的解決理由的規範性問題。實際上這是理由理論中最難啃的一塊。 3. 我懷疑很多文句的語法是錯誤的，無法弄明白句子成分的句子到處都是。有時，這使我的閱讀體驗十分糟糕。當然，這可能是因為我自己的語言能力不濟。

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reasons fundamentalism

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如果說元倫理學是汪洋大海，那這份作品就是其中最高的浪尖之一。短短百多頁探討瞭元倫理學領域內幾乎所有的重要問題，基於理由基礎主義立場，並著重迴擊瞭建構主義（Korsgaard、O'Neil、Rawls）和基於欲望的主觀主義（很多論證應該是從帕菲特那裏得到瞭啓發）；基於實在論立場迴擊瞭錶達主義乃至規範錶達主義（Gibbard））；承繼卡爾納普和奎因的相關學說提齣領域多元論，和一種robust naturalistic realism（Enoch）拉開距離，並迴應古怪性挑戰和隨附性挑戰；藉用羅爾斯的反思平衡模型為強認知主義奠基，同時為（部分的）道德多元論提供可能。唯一美中不足的就是對外在主義的迴應太少（真正的迴應其實隻有一段），藉Davidson的理論輕飄飄地打過瞭太極......

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展開辯護一套理由基礎主義實在論，整齊規範得體、淺顯精煉全麵，還很updated，感覺特彆厲害這麼一個講稿（好似終於有人直接順著Putnam指齣的"epistemic values are also values"往下講瞭講（p. 35）

Being Realistic about Reasons 在線電子書著者簡介

T. M. Scanlon received a BA from Princeton in 1962 and a PhD from Harvard in 1968, in between studying for a year at Brasenose College, Oxford. He taught at Princeton from 1966 until 1984, and at Harvard since that time. Scanlon is the author of many articles in moral and political philosophy, and of three books: What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998), The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (CUP, 2003), and Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Harvard University Press, 2008).

Being Realistic about Reasons 在線電子書著者簡介

Being Realistic about Reasons 在線電子書 pdf 下載 txt下載 epub 下載 mobi 在線電子書下載

Being Realistic about Reasons 在線電子書圖書描述

T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism—the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.

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