About the Author
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is the Julius Silver Professor of Politics and director of the Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy at New York University. He is the author of 16 books, including The Predictioneer’s Game.Alastair Smith is professor of politics at New York University. The recipient of three grants from the National Science Foundation and author of three books, he was chosen as the 2005 Karl Deutsch Award winner, given biennially to the best international relations scholar under the age of 40.
In this title, two renowned political scientists make the contrarian, research-based case that - regardless of any other factors political scientists or historians may find relevant - the calculations and actions of rulers are the driving force of all politics, and the primary goal of rulers is to maintain power as long as possible. In this clever and accessible book, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith introduce us to their perspective of the political world. They bare the logic of politics, starting from the simple premise that leaders pursue their own ends, and that populations either have, or more often don't have, the power to constrain them to a significant degree. The book is organized by a series interconnected questions, among them: Why do leaders who wreck their countries keep their jobs for so long? Why do autocracies have dismal economic policies? How are there so many suffering people in resource-rich lands? Why do 'natural disasters' disproportionately strike poor nations? Why do 'evil-doers' so often collect loads of foreign aid? Why are democracies so good at war? In answering these questions, the authors look at politics, the choices of public policies, and even decisions about war and peace as lying outside of conventional thinking about culture and history. They set aside ideas of civic virtue and psychopathology. Such notions simply are not central to understanding what leaders do and why they do it. Instead, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith see politicians as self-interested louts, just the sort of people you wouldn't want to have over for dinner, but without whom you might not have dinner at all. And from this perspective, they are able to answer some perplexing mysteries of politics, shed light on what we read in the newspapers every single day, and offer realistic ways of improving human governance.
最近在看《独裁者手册》这本书,已经过半。通过这本书,读者会发现,其实所有独裁者与民主国家,都具备相同的潜在选民,只是规模和“收买”的形式和范围的区别。这本书也是一本“管理学”意义的书。 潜在选民分为三个即:可替代者,有影响者和不可替代者(致胜联盟)。 小规模...
評分据作者称支撑“选择人理论”的数理模型都在《政治生存的逻辑》一书里,本书仅是个面向普通人的入门通俗读物,所以这书的理论看起来非常粗略框架,基本上摈除了宗教、意识形态、传统文化习俗什么的影响,更丝毫不扯伟光正的理想和道统,纯从群体社会中个人的“政治生存直觉”出...
評分本来对某些出版社愿意引进这样的书还是很高兴的,但如果把一本书经过断章取义的处理后再出版,很难讲还算不算做善事,因为有可能给原著抹黑。 翻了没几页,就看到“东北亚某个国家”这样的词了,本能的认为原著不可能这样写,于是找来英文原著做了简单的对照。没想到这一对照,...
評分给大家个数据,应该叫有影响力集团还是致胜联盟大家自己思考吧。(以下均复制网络http://t.m.youth.cn/transfer/index/url/mip.youth.cn/sz/201710/t20171024_10910065.htm) 关于中央委员会的具体人数,中共党章无硬性规定。相关条款指出:中央委员会委员和候补委员的名额,由...
評分本来对某些出版社愿意引进这样的书还是很高兴的,但如果把一本书经过断章取义的处理后再出版,很难讲还算不算做善事,因为有可能给原著抹黑。 翻了没几页,就看到“东北亚某个国家”这样的词了,本能的认为原著不可能这样写,于是找来英文原著做了简单的对照。没想到这一对照,...
選擇人理論(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selectorate_theory)有點像用曆史結果來決定建模準確性的遊戲論的一個特例,優點是這個模型適閤解釋很多有趣的現象,尤其是近代非洲諸國獨立後經曆的各種獨裁。如果你經常納悶為何一個獨裁者能穩固政權那麼久,也許這本書可以提供一些答案,或者至少是思考的源頭。
评分一本本可以用十頁紙講完的書。Read the first few chapters and skim the rest. 這本書最大的問題就是業餘,而且花瞭太多時間去業餘。淺薄的另一麵就是很多細節沒有得到起碼的有用的解釋。比如說,當他所認為導緻腐敗的元素一直是固定的時候,那他就有必要解釋一下在不同時間不同地點為什麼checks on corruption産生瞭變化。
评分非常好讀瞭 沒畏懼感 //想到主編說的 書不求讀完 當你知道你為什麼要讀並且達成瞭這項訴求 就可以放下瞭 覺得對 為自己看不完每一本專著找到好颱階
评分嗬嗬
评分書評已發:《放諸古今皆準的權力規則》
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